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ARTICLES
THE  RULE  OF  LAW  AS  A  LAW  OF  LAW*
Steven G. Calabresi**
Gary Lawson***
ABSTRACT
Justice Scalia is famous for his strong rule orientation, best articulated in his 1989 article,
The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules. In this Article, we explore the extent to which that rule
orientation in the context of constitutional interpretation is consistent with the Constitution’s
original meaning.  We conclude that it is far less consistent with the Constitution than is gener-
ally recognized.  The use of standards rather than rules is prescribed not only by a few provisions
in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment but also by key aspects of the 1788 constitu-
tional text.  The executive power, the necessary and proper power, and indeed the entire scheme of
enumerated powers are all infused with standards, largely through the Constitution’s implicit
incorporation of fiduciary norms as a background principle of interpretation.  The Constitution
often prescribes rules, but it often does not.  The law is what it is, whether or not it conforms to
some abstract jurisprudential norm.  The rule of law is not a law of rules.  It is a law of law.
INTRODUCTION
In 1980, a law professor at the University of Chicago named Antonin
Scalia advised the Supreme Court in the then-pending case of Industrial
Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute1 that, “even with all
© 2014 Steven G. Calabresi and Gary Lawson.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions
may reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the
Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* With apologies to, profound admiration and respect for, and modest disagreement
with Justice Antonin Scalia.
** Professor, Northwestern University School of Law.
*** Philip S. Beck Professor, Boston University School of Law.  I am grateful to the
participants at a workshop at Boston University School of Law for their many helpful
suggestions.
1 448 U.S. 607 (1980).  The case involved section 6(b)(5) of the Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970, which provides that the Secretary of Labor must promulgate stan-
dards for workplace exposure to toxic substances “which most adequately assure[ ], to the
extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer
material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such employee has regular
exposure to the hazard . . . for the period of his working life.”  29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5)
483
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its Frankenstein-like warts, knobs, and (concededly) dangers, the unconstitu-
tional delegation doctrine is worth hewing from the ice.”2  The chief danger
of reviving the nondelegation doctrine feared by Professor Scalia was that,
given “the difficulty of enunciating how much delegation is too much,”3 judi-
cial enforcement of a nondelegation principle would be “an invitation to
judicial policy making in the guise of constitutional law.”4  “But,” countered
Professor Scalia in response to his own concerns, “surely vague constitutional
doctrines are not automatically unacceptable.”5
In 1989, in Mistretta v. United States,6 a Supreme Court Justice named
Antonin Scalia faced a statute at least as empty and vacuous as the statute that
Professor Antonin Scalia had urged the Court to invalidate on nondelegation
grounds less than a decade earlier.  The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
charged the United States Sentencing Commission with devising legally bind-
ing sentencing ranges for federal offenses,7 subject only to three broad
goals,8 four broad purposes,9 seven incommensurable factors for determin-
ing offense categories,10 and eleven incommensurable factors for determin-
ing offender characteristics.11  It is hard to imagine a more open-ended grant
of authority to an agency on so important a matter.  Justice Scalia, without
citing Professor Scalia, wrote:
But while the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation is unquestionably a
fundamental element of our constitutional system, it is not an element read-
(2012).  For discussion of the fundamental emptiness of this statute—with or without the
“to the extent feasible” language that engaged the attention of some of the Justices in
Industrial Union—see Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327,
381–86 (2002).
2 Antonin Scalia, A Note on the Benzene Case, REGULATION, July/Aug. 1980, at 25, 28.
The ice from which the nondelegation doctrine had to be hewed was the deep freeze
placed on it after 1935, when it was first and last employed by the Court to invalidate a
congressional statute. See Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935) (first); A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) (last).
3 Scalia, supra note 2, at 27 (“The relevant factors are simply too multifarious: How
significant is the power in question (for example, fixing customs duties versus fixing prices
and wages for the entire economy)?  How technical are the judgments left for executive
determination (for example, establishing construction criteria for nuclear reactors versus
establishing standards for ‘fair’ advertising)?  What degree of social consensus exists with
respect to those nontechnical judgments committed to the executive (for example, defin-
ing ‘unfair or deceptive trade practices’ versus defining acceptable levels of air pollution)?
And—most imponderable of all—how great is the need for immediate action (for exam-
ple, the executive-determined price controls authorized in World War II versus those
authorized in 1970, during the Vietnam conflict)?”).
4 Id. at 28.
5 Id.
6 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
7 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (2012).
8 See id. § 991(b)(1), § 994(f).
9 See id. § 994(g); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
10 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(c).
11 See id. § 994(d).
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ily enforceable by the courts.  Once it is conceded, as it must be, that no
statute can be entirely precise, and that some judgments, even some judg-
ments involving policy considerations, must be left to the officers executing
the law and the judges applying it, the debate over unconstitutional delega-
tion becomes a debate not over a point of principle but over a question of
degree. . . . [I]t is small wonder that we have almost never felt qualified to
second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment
that can be left to those executing or applying the law.12
While Justice Scalia dissented from the Court’s judgment in Mistretta
upholding the statute because the Sentencing Commission did not have even
nominal executive authority to anchor its rulemaking power,13 he made it
clear that he “fully agree[d]” with the otherwise unanimous Court’s “rejec-
tion of petitioner’s contention that the doctrine of unconstitutional delega-
tion of legislative authority has been violated because of the lack of
intelligible, congressionally prescribed standards to guide the
Commission.”14
Moreover, in 2001, in Whitman v. American Trucking Association,15 Justice
Scalia wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court upholding against a
nondelegation challenge a provision of the Clean Air Act mandating the
administrative issuance of air quality standards, “the attainment and mainte-
nance of which in the judgment of the Administrator [of the Environmental
Protection Agency], based on such criteria and allowing an adequate margin
of safety, are requisite to protect the public health.”16  Apart from a brief
comment in a statutory interpretation case in 2012, in which the relevant
statute specified no governing standard whatsoever,17 nothing since 2001
suggests that Justice Scalia has changed his mind about enforcing the
nondelegation doctrine.
What happened during the transition from Professor Scalia to Justice
Scalia?  And was the Professor or the Justice correct?
Part I of this Article addresses the first question, which we think has a
very straightforward answer.  When Professor Scalia became a judge, certain
of his always-present jurisprudential inclinations came strongly to the fore.
The same year that Mistretta was decided, Justice Scalia published a famous
law review article entitled The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules18 that provides
12 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415–16 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
13 See id. at 420–21.
14 Id. at 416.
15 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
16 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).
17 See Reynolds v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 975, 986 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[I]t
is not entirely clear to me that Congress can constitutionally leave it to the Attorney Gen-
eral to decide—with no statutory standard whatever governing his discretion—whether a
criminal statute will or will not apply to certain individuals.  That seems to me sailing close
to the wind with regard to the principle that legislative powers are nondelegable . . . .”).
18 See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
As evidence of the article’s fame, a simple search of WestlawNext’s “Law Reviews and Jour-
nals” database on October 23, 2014 showed 1329 citations.
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crucial insight—in our view more insight than any other article or opinion
that he has written—into his jurisprudential philosophy.  While the article
itself has the modest goal of describing how Justice Scalia thinks courts
should formulate judge-made doctrinal principles,19 the title and the sub-
themes running though the piece perfectly encapsulate Justice Scalia’s broad
approach to constitutional (and indeed all kinds of) adjudication.
For Justice Scalia, the essence of law is impersonal rules that can be
impersonally applied.  While he stopped short in The Rule of Law as a Law of
Rules of calling for an absolute ban on balancing tests and vague totality-of-
the-circumstances standards—he noted dryly that “for my sins, I will probably
write some of the opinions that use them”20—it is clear that Justice Scalia
finds those kinds of inquiries antithetical to both the judicial enterprise and
the very notion of law.  Indeed, he describes decisions under these kinds of
vague standards as “not so much pronouncing the law in the normal sense as
engaging in the less exalted function of fact finding.”21  If a legal norm is not
rule-like, then for Justice Scalia it is not really law at all—or at the very least
not law that is judicially enforceable.
Professor Scalia worried about this sort of thing quite a bit back in 1980,
but clearly Justice Scalia, when faced with the actual task of formulating a
workable nondelegation doctrine, elevated those worries to a new level.
Because it is impossible to formulate the nondelegation doctrine in a fashion
that does not leave considerable room for judicial discretion,22 it is not sur-
prising that Justice Scalia effectively declared it nonjusticiable.
We believe that almost all of Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence, including
some parts that are sometimes thought to be anomalous, can be understood
in terms of his strong equation of law and rules.  This conception of law as
properly consisting only of rules generally overwhelms any other influences
on Justice Scalia’s decisionmaking, including influences drawn from inter-
pretative theory.23  Thus, on more than infrequent occasions, Justice Scalia’s
law-of-rules approach seems to lead to results that are inconsistent with his
professed originalist methodology, which he set forth in another famous
1989 law review article called Originalism: The Lesser Evil.24  His approach to
the nondelegation doctrine is a good example, as is his treatment of the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.25
19 See id. at 1176–77.
20 Id. at 1187.
21 Id. at 1180–81.
22 See infra notes 36–45 and accompanying text.
23 We are hardly the first to make this observation. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword:
The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 82 (1992) (“[F]or Justice Scalia, the
enterprise of rationalizing constitutional interpretation is dominated by favoritism for
rules.  If the quest for rules is primary, it does not matter on which interpretive axis he
finds one.”).
24 See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).  A
search of WestlawNext’s “Law Reviews and Law Journals” database on October 23, 2014
yielded a “mere” 1005 citations to this article.
25 See infra notes 52–62 and accompanying text.
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All of this is understandable—and we say understandable rather than
correct—once one grasps that The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules rather than
Originalism: The Lesser Evil is the urtext for Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence.  Put
in constitutional terms, if the “judicial Power”26 is fundamentally the power
and duty to decide cases in accordance with governing law,27 then for Justice
Scalia that amounts to the power and duty to decide cases in accordance with
governing rules.
In Part II, we address whether Professor Scalia or Justice Scalia has the
stronger argument on the legal acceptability of standards in constitutional
law, and we come down squarely on the side of Professor Scalia.  As (if we
may be so bold) a matter of interpretation,28 Justice Scalia is wrong to try to
impose an across-the-board, rules-oriented presumption on the Constitution.
The Constitution sometimes prescribes rules and it sometimes prescribes
standards.  Indeed, as we will show, it prescribes standards more often than
one might think, including in the text of the Constitution of 1788.  The origi-
nal document is infused with standards to a degree that often escapes notice.
The nondelegation doctrine is only the tip of the iceberg; all of the enumer-
ated powers are granted against a background of fiduciary law that is largely
driven by standards.  If Justice Scalia refuses to enforce constitutional provi-
sions that he does not regard as sufficiently rule-like, such as the nondelega-
tion principle or less-than-absolute antidiscrimination norms,29 the result will
be to sustain objectively unconstitutional governmental acts and institutions
or to invalidate objectively constitutional ones.
Of course, Justice Scalia does not advance his rule orientation directly as
a theory of meaning; he grounds it primarily in concerns about the institu-
tional role of courts.  But, as we suggested above, his argument could be cast
in interpretative terms by treating it as a reading of Article III’s grant of the
“judicial Power.”30  That is, Justice Scalia could be saying that because the
judicial power is the power to apply law to particular disputes, Article III
requires federal courts to apply only rules in adjudication because only rules
actually constitute law.  If the American Constitution was a common law con-
struct along the lines of a simple caricature of the British Constitution, for
which the object of interpretation is to induce the norms that are immanent
in practices, customs, and social structures, there would in fact be much to
Justice Scalia’s position; there are very good arguments for conducting com-
mon law adjudication of that form with a strong, and perhaps even over-
whelming, preference for rules.31  Accordingly, when federal courts are
26 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
27 See Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1273–74 (1996).
28 Cf. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
(1997).
29 See infra notes 46–51 and accompanying text.
30 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
31 Indeed, we plan to make those arguments in a subsequent work, and they are fore-
shadowed in Steven G. Calabresi & Bradley G. Silverman, Hayek and the Citation of Foreign
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fashioning federal common law, Justice Scalia’s jurisprudential approach is
sound.  But interpretation of the American Constitution is not a common law
enterprise of that sort.32  The American Constitution already provides the
relevant norms in explicit fashion; the job of interpretation is to decode
them and apply their meaning deductively to particular circumstances.  For
that enterprise, Article III instructs courts to find and apply the law—
whatever that law may be and whatever form the relevant norms happen to
take.  And if the Constitution wants to defy an ideal conception of legal meta-
physics and define some standards to be law, that is the Constitution’s pre-
rogative.  If federal courts are to be faithful to their charge under Article III,
the rule of law must be a law of law.33
I
Randy Barnett has flatly accused Justice Scalia of “ignoring the original
meaning of those portions of the Constitution that conflict with his concep-
tion of ‘the rule of law as a law of rules.’”34  Justice Scalia, for his part, thinks
that his commitment to rules flows quite naturally from his theory of inter-
pretation, writing that “it is perhaps easier for me than it is for some judges to
develop general rules, because I am more inclined to adhere closely to the
plain meaning of a text.”35  Professor Barnett and Justice Scalia are both, as
Obi Wan might say, right from a particular point of view, and it is not our
task in this Part to mediate that dispute.  Rather, we aim here simply to
describe the extent to which Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence is driven by a
search for rules rather than a more calibrated interpretative search for origi-
nal meaning.  Subsequently, in Part II, we explore the extent to which that
commitment is consistent with the Constitution.
There are numerous examples of Justice Scalia’s rule-driven rather than
meaning-driven approach to decisionmaking, including many examples in
which that approach seems to place him at odds with the consensus views of
Law, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 16–17) (on file with authors).
Professor Lawson, speaking only for himself, believes that there might also be a very mod-
est case for preferring rules to standards in the interpretation of the actual American Con-
stitution in close cases, though the rule-preference would enter only through an
epistemological decision about when to cease looking for additional evidence of the right
answer.  He plans to explore this possibility in a future work, though even if he is right, it
would affect the conclusions of this paper only at some very remote margins.
32 On the differences among common law, statutory, and constitutional adjudication
from the perspective of a Hayekian account of rules, see Nicholas Terrell, Private Law,
Legislation, and Constitutional Limitations: A Modern Hayekian Analysis of Law (unpublished
manuscript at 33–50) (on file with authors).
33 Accord JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 6–7, 14, 23–24 (2011); see David A.
Strauss, On the Origin of Rules (with Apologies to Darwin): A Comment on Antonin Scalia’s The
Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 997, 1006 (2008) (“Textualism will lead
you to rules only when the text happens to prescribe a rule.”).
34 Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U.
CIN. L. REV. 7, 12 (2006).
35 Scalia, supra note 18, at 1184.
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his fellow originalists (including us).  We mean for this discussion to be illus-
trative, not exhaustive.
The example of the nondelegation doctrine is perhaps the clearest case.
The originalist case for a nondelegation doctrine is very strong, and even
overwhelming.36  But because application of the doctrine requires drawing
lines among the legislative, executive, and judicial powers—a task that James
Madison said “puzzle[s] the greatest adepts in political science”37 and that
Chief Justice John Marshall said was “a subject of delicate and difficult
inquiry”38—it will necessarily entail a strong element of judgment in accor-
dance with hard-to-articulate standards.  Chief Justice Marshall described the
inquiry as distinguishing “those important subjects, which must be entirely
regulated by the legislature itself, from those of less interest, in which a general
provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act under such
general provisions to fill up the details.”39  Professor Lawson, after spending
much of his professional life studying the nondelegation doctrine, came up
with a formulation (which he intends as a serious description of the actual
required inquiry): “Congress must make whatever policy decisions are suffi-
ciently important to the statutory scheme at issue so that Congress must make
them.”40  In other words, “[t]he line between legislative and executive power
(or between legislative and judicial power) must be drawn in the context of
each particular statutory scheme.  In every case, Congress must make the cen-
36 The essence of an originalist case for a standards-based nondelegation doctrine is
laid out in Lawson, supra note 1, at 336–53, and Gary Lawson, Discretion as Delegation: The
“Proper” Understanding of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 268 (2005);
see also Michael B. Rappaport, The Selective Nondelegation Doctrine and the Line Item Veto: A
New Approach to the Nondelegation Doctrine and Its Implications for Clinton v. City of New York,
76 TUL. L. REV. 265, 303–12 (2001) (defending a constitutional nondelegation doctrine
and noting that it might apply differently in varying contexts).  Professor Lawson today
would locate the source of the nondelegation principle in the fiduciary character of the
Constitution rather than, as he argued in 2002 and 2005, the Necessary and Proper Clause,
which is simply a context-specific articulation of the broader fiduciary norms that underlie
the document.  This change in view, however, affects only the domain of the nondelegation
doctrine rather than its formulation.  That is, if the doctrine springs from the Necessary and
Proper Clause, it would not apply to legislation regarding federal territories, federal lands,
or the District of Columbia because congressional power over those areas does not stem
from the Necessary and Proper Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (giving Congress
power of “exclusive Legislation” over the District of Columbia); id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (giving
Congress power to make “all needful Rules and Regulations respecting” federal territories
or property).  A fiduciary theory of nondelegation, however, would extend the doctrine to
all exercises of congressional power, which Professor Lawson now thinks is the better view.
See Gary Lawson, Guy I. Seidman & Robert G. Natelson, The Fiduciary Foundations of Federal
Equal Protection, 94 B.U. L. REV. 415, 447–48 (2014).  But the content of the doctrine is the
same regardless of its precise domain.
37 THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 183 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClel-
lan eds., 2001).
38 Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 46 (1825).
39 Id. at 43 (emphasis added).
40 Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231,
1239 (1994).
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tral, fundamental decisions, but Congress can leave ancillary matters to the
President or the courts.”41
These are not the kinds of formulations that are likely to inspire Justice
Scalia.  It is therefore not surprising that he effectively announced in Mistretta
that he would normally not enforce the nondelegation doctrine, notwith-
standing his acknowledgement that it is “unquestionably a fundamental ele-
ment of our constitutional system,”42 because it is “a debate not over a point
of principle but over a question of degree.”43  The clear implication is that
debates over questions of degree are not matters of law (or principle) and
are accordingly not fit subjects for constitutional adjudication by the courts,
even when there are strong originalist reasons for thinking that the Constitu-
tion prescribes a degree-oriented inquiry.  Justice Scalia thus treats the Con-
stitution as though it is subject to an implicit version of § 701(a)(2) of the
Administrative Procedure Act: judicial review is not available when a matter is
“committed to agency [or legislative] discretion by law,”44 meaning that
there is simply “no law to apply.”45  And in this context, no law to apply
means no rule to apply.
Other examples of Justice Scalia’s rule orientation abound.  For
instance, Justice Scalia endorses a strict colorblind interpretation of the Con-
stitution that, among other things, categorically forbids all state and federal
affirmative action efforts—a view that he strongly reiterated in 2013.46  It has
been observed on many occasions that this is a difficult position to derive
from originalist interpretative methods.47  To be sure, there is a serious
originalist case for concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment indeed
imposes a colorblind norm on the States;48 we do not mean to resolve the
issue here or to declare flatly that Justice Scalia is wrong.  Our points are only
that Justice Scalia has not grounded his position in that originalist case49 and
that the case is far from a slam-dunk.  The categorical unconstitutionality of
federal rather than state affirmative action is, if anything, even less clear.  As
an original matter, the doctrine of “federal equal protection” is grounded in
the fiduciary character of the Constitution and, in particular, in the fiduciary
requirement that agents serving multiple principals treat all of the principals
41 Lawson, supra note 1, at 376–77.
42 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
43 Id.
44 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2012).
45 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (quoting
S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 26 (1945)).
46 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2422 (2013) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (“I adhere to the view I expressed in Grutter v. Bollinger: ‘The Constitution proscribes
government discrimination on the basis of race, and state-provided education is no excep-
tion.’” (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part))).
47 See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 427 (1997).
48 See Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Colorblind Constitution, 89 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 71, 74–77 (2013).
49 See id. at 76–77.
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fairly and reasonably.50  That fiduciary norm, however, does not necessarily
mandate strictly equal treatment in all cases,51 and figuring out the proper
application of that norm to federal affirmative action is actually very difficult
in many contexts.  If Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence was driven primarily by
interpretative originalism, he would probably find matters such as the consti-
tutionality of affirmative action, particularly federal affirmative action, quite
vexing.  But he is adamant about imposing a strict colorblind norm on all
government action.  This position is completely understandable if one views
it through the lens of “law as rules”—that is, if one takes The Rule of Law as a
Law of Rules rather than Originalism: The Lesser Evil as the guiding text.  “No
racial discrimination” is far more rule-like than “no unfair or unwarranted
racial discrimination”—even if the latter is actually closer to the “true” consti-
tutional norm.
As far as action by the states is concerned, the strong consensus among
originalist scholars is that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, rather than the Equal Protection Clause, is the appropri-
ate source of a general nondiscrimination norm, with the Equal Protection
Clause’s reference to “protection of the laws” focused on executive and judi-
cial application of norms.52  Acceptance of this view, however, requires one
to see the Privileges or Immunities Clause as the central provision in Section
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.53  Could that also make it the appropriate
vehicle (if there is one) for some kind of incorporation of the Bill of Rights
against the states?  Or perhaps even for enforcement against the states of
some category of “privileges or immunities” not limited by the specification
in the 1791 Bill of Rights?
This issue squarely arose in McDonald v. City of Chicago,54 in which the
Court had to decide whether to apply the Second Amendment’s guarantee of
an individual right to keep and bear arms55 to state and local governments.
The majority opinion, which Justice Scalia joined, so applied it pursuant to
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,56 as has been the
Court’s practice with regard to incorporation for more than a century.57  Jus-
tice Thomas wrote an extensive, scholarly concurring opinion setting out the
originalist case for reliance upon the Privileges or Immunities Clause
50 See Lawson, Seidman & Natelson, supra note 36, at 424–46.
51 See id. at 441–46.
52 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Andrea Mathews, Originalism and Loving v. Virginia,
2012 BYU L. REV. 1393, 1419; John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1390 (1992).
53 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Originalist and Normative Case Against Judicial Activ-
ism: A Reply to Professor Barnett, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1086 (2005).
54 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
55 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).  We do not address here
whether Heller was correctly decided.
56 See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 766–70.
57 See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236–39 (1897)
(applying the principles of the Takings Clause to the states).
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instead.58  Justice Scalia did not give a reason for not joining Justice
Thomas’s opinion other than precedent.  Perhaps that is more than suffi-
cient reason for anyone who does not have a bugaboo about precedent on
his brain,59 but we suspect that Justice Scalia might be reluctant to open a
can of worms about what constitutes “privileges or immunities” without a
specified rule to cabin judicial discretion.  After all, Justice Scalia has very
reluctantly acceded to precedent with respect to substantive due process (of
which incorporation is a special case) only on the condition that rights
imported through that mechanism be defined by reference to “the most spe-
cific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to,
the asserted right can be identified,”60 because “a rule of law that binds
neither by text nor by any particular, identifiable tradition is no rule of law at
all.”61  Surely he would say the same of attempts to derive doctrine from the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, even if that clause is the “correct” provision
to apply under originalism.62
There are numerous instances other than constitutional colorblindness
in which Justice Scalia has firmly opted for a rule-like norm when the “cor-
rect” originalist answer is either a standard or, at best, unclear.  In Tennessee
v. Lane,63 Justice Scalia exhaustively catalogued the many cases, spanning
provisions from Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the various pro-
visions of the Eighth Amendment to the existence/meaning/universe/mys-
tery-of-life clause intuited by the joint opinion in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,64 in which he has refused to go along with
“proportionality” tests65 because they are “flabby” and “a standing invitation
to judicial arbitrariness and policy-driven decisionmaking.”66  In some of
those cases, such as Casey, the originalist answer is clear and Justice Scalia’s
decision was wholly in sync with it.67  In others, however, such as the correct
meaning of the Eighth Amendment, matters are more difficult.  It would
require a separate article to produce an originalist analysis of the Eight
Amendment, so we are not saying that Justice Scalia was necessarily wrong
(though we suspect that he might have been) to reject a proportionality anal-
58 McDonald, 561 U.S. at 805–58 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
59 See Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case Against Precedent Revisited, 5 AVE
MARIA L. REV. 1 (2007); Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 23 (1994).
60 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion).
61 Id.
62 For similar suspicions, see James E. Fleming, The New Originalist Manifesto, 28 CONST.
COMMENT. 539, 553–56 (2013) (book review).
63 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
64 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion).
65 See Lane, 541 U.S. at 557 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
66 Id. at 557–58.
67 See Steven G. Calabresi, Text, Precedent, and the Constitution: Some Originalist and Nor-
mative Arguments for Overruling Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
22 CONST. COMMENT. 311 (2005).
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ysis in Eighth Amendment cases.  Our point is only that his rejection was
driven by a theory of law rather than by a theory of interpretation.68
Without belaboring the point, similar rule-oriented themes can be
drawn from much of Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence, involving provisions as
diverse as the Takings Clause,69 the Appointments Clause,70 and the Con-
frontation Clause.71  Moreover, his rule orientation fully explains much of
his behavior that sometimes perplexes critics.  For instance, before the deci-
sion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius72 was issued, many
people thought that Justice Scalia might uphold the individual mandate in
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in view of his opinion in Gon-
zales v. Raich73 approving the power of Congress to regulate the growing of
plants in one’s home for personal use.74  Some have subsequently criticized
Justice Scalia’s vote in Sebelius to invalidate the mandate as inconsistent with
his position in Raich.75  But any apparent inconsistency vanishes when one
thinks about Justice Scalia’s view of law as rules.  Justice Scalia voted as he did
in Raich because he thought (wrongly as a matter of original meaning but
consistently with precedent) that federal power under the Necessary and
Proper Clause included the power to regulate even noneconomic local activ-
ity where it is a “necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate
commerce.”76  Throw in the (also wrong as a matter of original meaning but
consistent with precedent) premise that “necessary” means “rationally related
to,”77 and one has a rule: Congress can regulate virtually any activity, however
68 See Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin Toh, On What Distinguishes New Originalism from Old:
A Jurisprudential Take, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2013) (suggesting that much of modern
originalist thought is based on theories of law rather than theories of meaning).
69 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (searching for a categorical
rule in takings jurisprudence).
70 See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997) (searching for a categorical rule
for defining inferior officers).
71 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (searching for a categorical rule
governing when the introduction of hearsay evidence violates the Sixth Amendment).
72 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
73 545 U.S. 1, 33 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring).
74 See, e.g., Sam Stein, Justice Scalia, Not Kennedy, Eyed as Key Vote in Support of Health
Care, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 3, 2011, 5:53 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/
02/03/justice-scalia-health-care-reform_n_818396.html (noting some scholars believed
that Justice Scalia would be an important vote in the health care debated based on his
concurring opinion in Raich).
75 See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the Limits of
Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 567, 617 n.193 (2013) (“I see no con-
vincingly principled distinction between that ground for upholding the [Controlled Sub-
stances Act] in Raich and his vote to strike down the individual mandate in NFIB.”).
76 Raich, 545 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring).
77 The modern Court has repeatedly described the inquiry into necessity as a rational-
ity test. See, e.g., United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 134 (2010); Sabri v. United
States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004).  The correct inquiry, however, is the one suggested by
James Madison that runs between the latitudinarian rational basis test favored by Hamilton
and the strict necessity standard favored by Jefferson. See Lawson, supra note 36, at 246–48.
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local, when it is done pursuant to a general scheme that regulates interstate
commerce.  The individual mandate is not within this rule, because failing to
purchase health insurance is not activity in this sense at all.78 Raich’s rule
does not allow Congress to regulate people for sitting in their living rooms
and doing nothing.  In order to extend Congress’s power to include the indi-
vidual mandate, a new rule was needed.  The government was offered the
chance to provide such a rule but was not able to come up with a plausible
rule that would authorize the mandate.79  For Justice Scalia, the case was
therefore clear: no rule, no law, no mandate.
As Justice Scalia himself predicted,80 there are occasions in which Justice
Scalia opts for standards over rules.  That is not surprising; real-world adjudi-
cation is driven by a complicated network of forces, some of which are very
unruly.  For example, any Justice who gives any weight at all to precedent will
see even the strongest interpretative or jurisprudential inclinations compro-
mised from time to time.  And even the strongest preference for rules (or, for
that matter, the strongest preference for standards) will surely give way when
the only available rules (or standards) are interpretatively implausible.
A good illustration of the tensions in real-world adjudication is United
States v. Virginia,81 in which the Court held unconstitutional as a violation of
equal protection the single-sex admission policy of the Virginia Military Insti-
tute (VMI), using a standard of review approaching, if not quite reaching,
the “strict scrutiny” generally afforded classifications based on race or
national origin.82  Strict (or near-strict) scrutiny will almost always result in
invalidation of challenged governmental action and is therefore more rule-
like than an “intermediate” scrutiny that involves more calibrated balancing
of governmental, social, and private interests by asking whether there is “a
78 Living and breathing are, of course, activities of sorts, but the rule in Raich rather
clearly contemplated something more particular and (for lack of a better word) active to
count as “activity.”  Any such qualification necessarily makes the rule less determinate, but
a norm does not have to be entirely determinate in order to be a rule. See infra note 90
(describing the spectrum of rules and standards).  Seeking to participate in the market for
health care services, by contrast, is probably activity within the meaning of Raich—and the
joint opinion in Sebelius accordingly made clear that Congress could properly have regu-
lated people’s insurance practices at that point of entry. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2647 (2012) (joint dissent).
79 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2647 (joint dissent) (“The Government was
invited, at oral argument, to suggest what federal controls over private conduct (other than
those explicitly prohibited by the Bill of Rights or other constitutional controls) could not
be justified as necessary and proper for the carrying out of a general regulatory scheme.  It
was unable to name any.” (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 27–30, 43–45, Nat’l Fed’n
of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 2566 (No. 11-398))).  To be sure, “the government can regulate
anything and everything” is a rule, just as is “the government always wins” or “the govern-
ment always wins on even-numbered Tuesdays.”  For Justice Scalia, rule-ness is a necessary
but not sufficient condition for a norm to be law.  The norm must also be grounded in
some authoritative source.
80 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
81 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
82 See id. at 532–33.
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‘substantial relation’ between the classification and the state interests that it
serves.”83  Justice Scalia nonetheless advocated the use of intermediate scru-
tiny, under which he would have upheld VMI’s admissions policy.84
But of course this case, as do many real-world cases, presented a far
more complex set of choices than a decision between rules and standards.
Justice Scalia regards the Court’s entire scheme of levels of review for classifi-
cations as “made-up tests,”85 which he accepts only provisionally, partly
because of precedent and partly because he believes that, if fairly and hon-
estly applied, such “abstract tests . . . are essential to evaluating whether the
new restrictions that a changing society constantly imposes upon private con-
duct comport with that ‘equal protection’ our society has always accorded in
the past.”86  And even his seeming acceptance of standard-like balancing is
mitigated somewhat by his insistence that interest balancing must serve only
to protect rather than change pre-existing social traditions:
But in my view the function of this Court is to preserve our society’s values
regarding (among other things) equal protection, not to revise them; to pre-
vent backsliding from the degree of restriction the Constitution imposed
upon democratic government, not to prescribe, on our own authority, pro-
gressively higher degrees.  For that reason it is my view that, whatever
abstract tests we may choose to devise, they cannot supersede—and indeed
ought to be crafted so as to reflect—those constant and unbroken national
traditions that embody the people’s understanding of ambiguous constitu-
tional texts.87
Even when adopting standards, Justice Scalia hedges them with rules.  The
resulting levels of scrutiny as applied by Justice Scalia in United States v. Vir-
ginia, while hardly rule-like, represent Justice Scalia’s accommodation to
some very powerful realities of modern equal protection adjudication.  If that
makes Justice Scalia something of a “faint-hearted rule-ist,”88 he can at least
plausibly claim that he is more consistent in his orientation than are most
people in this business.
Others can surely find other examples of Justice Scalia choosing less
rather than more rule-like options.89  We do not claim that a rule-preference
is the only force driving Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence; that would be flat-out
silly.  But we do think that a very strong rule-preference is one of the most
important vectors that affects his decisions and that in many contexts that
rule vector swamps other considerations, including the Constitution’s origi-
nal meaning.
83 Id. at 573 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
84 See id. at 570–71.
85 Id. at 570.
86 Id. at 568.
87 Id.
88 Cf. Scalia, supra note 24, at 864 (describing himself as a “faint-hearted originalist”).
89 It would be very difficult, for example, to characterize standing law—as articulated
by Justice Scalia or by anyone else—as “rule-like” in any meaningful sense.
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If the Constitution objectively consisted entirely of rules, Justice Scalia’s
position would be trivially correct as an application of the Constitution.  But
that is emphatically not the case.
II
There is no single, noncontroversial way to determine the extent to
which a norm is rule-like.  Rules, as distinct from standards or particularistic
decisionmaking methods, have some significant degree of generality and def-
initeness,90 but there is no metric for measuring how general and/or definite
something must be in order to be called a rule.  Rules are sometimes defined
in terms of their effects—for example, rules “say that if certain routinely
identifiable circumstances obtain, then a certain determinate response is
required, or permitted, or that it will have a certain legal standing or conse-
quence attached”91—and are sometimes said to be “opaque to their justifica-
tions,”92 meaning that “we usually need not look to the values that warrant
their adoption in order to know when they are to be applied.”93  None of
this, however, provides a foolproof way to tell whether a particular norm is a
rule or a standard.94
Notwithstanding these difficulties, people distinguish rules from stan-
dards all of the time, and at least over a significant range of cases there is
little dispute about the proper characterizations.  Everyone understands that
when the Constitution says that a person must “have attained to the Age of
thirty five Years”95 in order to be President, it is prescribing a rule, and when
tort law makes the test of liability the behavior of the “reasonable person,”96
90 See LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY, RULES, AND
THE DILEMMAS OF LAW 30–31 (2001); see also ALAN H. GOLDMAN, PRACTICAL RULES 108
(2002) (noting that rules “should be definite and their application should be predict-
able”); Sullivan, supra note 23, at 58 (“A legal directive is ‘rule’-like when it binds a deci-
sion-maker to respond in a determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering
facts.”).  To be sure, although this is the canonical set of criteria for rule-ness, as a jurispru-
dential matter it is not obvious that rules are always more definite or predictable than
standards.  Indeed, it is possible that the rules/standards distinction cannot really be
drawn verbally but can only be recognized in practice, though that is a matter for another
day.  We are grateful to David Lyons for highlighting this problem of definition.
91 GOLDMAN, supra note 90, at 107; cf. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 560 (1992) (adopting a scheme of definitions “in which
the only distinction between rules and standards is the extent to which efforts to give content to the law
are undertaken before or after individuals act”).
92 GOLDMAN, supra note 90, at 107.
93 Id.
94 For a readable general introduction to the distinction between rules and standards,
which provides no clear method for demarcating the line between them, see Lawrence B.
Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 026: Rules, Standards, Principles, Catalogs, and Discretion, LEGAL
THEORY LEXICON, http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/03/legal_theo
ry_le_3.html (last modified Sept. 22, 2014).
95 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
96 See 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 7 (2014) (“[N]egligence consists of acting other
than as a reasonable person would do in the circumstances . . . .”).
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it is prescribing a standard.  The existence of numerous hard cases of classifi-
cation does not eliminate the easy ones, even if one cannot precisely articu-
late what makes the easy cases easy.
There are many easy cases in which the Constitution rather obviously
prescribes standards rather than rules.  The usual example is the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition against “unreasonable searches and seizures,”97
which stands in marked (even if not sharp) contrast to the more rule-like
requirement in the same amendment that courts can only issue warrants
“particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.”98  A quick look through the rest of the Bill of Rights yields a
number of relatively plain rules rather than standards, such as the flat bans
on congressional laws “respecting an establishment of religion”99 or infring-
ing “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,”100 provisions forbidding
the federal government from making any person “be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb”101 or compelling a person
“in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,”102 and the requirement
that criminal trials be conducted in the “district wherein the crime shall have
been committed; which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law.”103  It also yields a substantial number of standards in addition to the
search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment.  The requirement of
indictment by grand jury can be suspended in case of “public danger,”104
deprivations of life, liberty, and property must be accompanied by “due pro-
cess of law,”105 compensation for takings of property must be “just,”106 crimi-
nal defendants must be given “speedy”107 trials by “impartial”108 juries, and
neither fines nor bail shall be “excessive.”109  Again keeping in mind that
there is no hard and fast line between rules and standards, these latter provi-
sions all seem to have at least one foot, if not both feet, in the “standards”
section.
The original constitutional text at first glance seems much more rule-
like.110  The various selection procedures for members of Congress, the Pres-
ident, and the Vice President, in particular, look quite detailed and precise,
and the requirements for valid legislation in Article I, Section 7 do not
97 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
98 Id.  Midway between those two provisions on the rules/standards spectrum stands
the requirement that warrants issue only upon a showing of “probable cause.” Id.
99 Id. amend. I.
100 Id. amend. II.
101 Id. amend. V.
102 Id.
103 Id. amend. VI.
104 Id. amend. V.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. amend. VI.
108 Id.
109 Id. amend. VIII.
110 See GOLDMAN, supra note 90, at 122–23.
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appear to leave much to the imagination.  Importantly, a rule-like formula-
tion does not necessarily exclude all ambiguity or vagueness in terms,111 so to
say that a provision is rule-like does not mean that it is necessarily crisp and
clear in all applications.  The Appointments Clause, for example, reads like a
highly technical rule,112 but the interpretative questions left unanswered by
the text are legion.113  Article I, Section 7 is about as rule-like a provision as
one can draft,114 but that does not foreclose disputes about what constitutes
a “Bill”115 or what sorts of legislative actions, other than passage of a bill,
require presidential presentment.116  It is only to say that the provision takes
111 On the important distinction between ambiguity and vagueness, see Lawrence B.
Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 469–70 (2013).
112 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States,
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established
by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as
they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments.”).
113 For an incomplete compendium of such questions, many of which result in stan-
dard-like answers as a matter of original meaning, see GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW 142–43 (6th ed. 2013).
114 For the text of the legislative process, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7:
[1] All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representa-
tives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.
[2] Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the
Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the
United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his
Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the
Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it.  If after such
Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be
sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise
be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a
Law.  But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas
and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be
entered on the Journal of each House respectively.  If any Bill shall not be
returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have
been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had
signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which
Case it shall not be a Law.
[3] Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate
and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjourn-
ment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the
Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him,
shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives,
according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.
115 See J. Gregory Sidak & Thomas A. Smith, Four Faces of the Item Veto: A Reply to Tribe
and Kurland, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 466–74 (1990).
116 See Gary Lawson, Burning Down the House (and Senate): A Presentment Requirement for
Legislative Subpoenas Under the Orders, Resolutions, and Votes Clause, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1373
(2005); Seth Barrett Tillman, A Textualist Defense of Article I, Section 7, Clause 3: Why Hol-
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a form that, more than not, meets the generality and determinateness crite-
ria for being a rule.  With this understanding, it is fair to say that the bulk of
the original Constitution consists primarily of rules.
But there is also ample representation of standards even in the original
text of the Constitution, albeit in a somewhat subtle form.  Indeed, standards
infuse the Constitution of 1788 in a way that is easy to miss on a casual
reading.
The Article II Vesting Clause provides that “[t]he executive Power shall
be vested in a President of the United States of America.”117  On its face, this
looks like a rule, and in many contexts it functions that way118 (which is why
the rules/standards spectrum is a spectrum).119  But it has important stan-
dard-like features as well.  Putting aside for present purposes the many dis-
putes over the contours of the “executive Power,”120 the indisputable core of
that power is the ability and obligation121 to execute the laws.122  And at the
core of the power and duty to execute the laws is the power and duty to select
the means of enforcement.  Presidents, acting personally or through agents,
must, among other things, choose whether to proceed by rulemaking or
adjudication where that is a statutory option, allocate scarce resources among
competing enforcement priorities, and select from among a wide range of
both civil and criminal investigatory and enforcement techniques.  The con-
stitutional text is expressly silent on these crucial implemental features of the
executive power.
But that express textual silence does not mean an absence of constitu-
tional guidance and constraint.  Quite to the contrary.  The President’s exec-
utive power is a delegated power to implement law.  In the late eighteenth
century, under then-venerable English principles of administrative law, dele-
gated implemental power was subject to fundamental, implicit constraints
that much later took the name of the principle of reasonableness.123  Generally
speaking, the principle of reasonableness “requires delegated power to be
lingsworth v. Virginia Was Rightly Decided, and Why INS v. Chadha Was Wrongly Reasoned, 83
TEX. L. REV. 1265 (2005); Seth Barrett Tillman, The Domain of Constitutional Delegations
Under the Orders, Resolutions, and Votes Clause, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1389 (2005).
117 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
118 See, e.g., Gary Lawson, It Depends, 62 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 139, 141–42 (2009)
(noting that Article II vests all of the executive power in the President even if some of that
vesting was unwise or inconvenient).
119 See Sullivan, supra note 23, at 58 n.231 (noting that there is a “continuum” of rules
and standards).
120 See, e.g., Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Imbecilic Executive, 99 VA. L. REV. 1361
(2013) (discussing and criticizing theories of emergency executive power).
121 That obligation is confirmed by the Take Care Clause, which commands the Presi-
dent to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
122 See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power,
2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 701.
123 For detailed treatments of the principle of reasonableness, of which this discussion
is a very brief summary, see GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE
52–56 (2004); Gary Lawson & Guy I. Seidman, Necessity, Propriety, and Reasonableness, in
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exercised in an impartial, efficacious, proportionate, and rights-regarding
fashion,”124 even when the grant of power contains no such specification.  As
an English court said in 1658, “wheresoever a commissioner or other person
hath power given to do a thing at his discretion, it is to be understood of
sound discretion, and according to law, and . . . this Court hath power to
redress things otherwise done by them.”125  Thus, a sewer commission
granted power to assess the costs of water control measures as the commis-
sioners “shall deem most convenient to be ordained”126 could not lawfully
assess the full costs on one landowner when others were benefitted by the
measure.127  Paving commissioners given power to pave and repair streets “in
such manner as the commissioners shall think fit” could not lawfully raise a
street so high that it obstructed a landowner’s doors and windows.128  And a
President who made prosecutorial decisions by flipping a coin or consulting
a fortune teller would exceed the scope of his delegated “executive Power”—
just as a judge would exceed the scope of her “judicial Power” by pulling
judgments out of a hat.  Similarly, a President who burned down a city in
order to catch someone accused of the interstate shipment of small amounts
of marijuana would be acting not only unwisely but also unconstitutionally
and would accordingly be subject to impeachment and removal for
malfeasance.
An early twentieth-century English court aptly summarized the principle
of reasonableness:
A person in whom is vested a discretion must exercise his discretion upon
reasonable grounds.  A discretion does not empower a man to do what he
likes merely because he is minded to do so—he must in the exercise of his
discretion do not what he likes but what he ought.  In other words, he must,
by use of his reason, ascertain and follow the course which reason directs.
He must act reasonably.129
This requirement of reasonableness is the quintessential standard, and it
underlies the executive (as well as the judicial) power delegated by the Con-
stitution.  Moreover, the range of actions that will satisfy the principle of rea-
sonableness varies with circumstances.  This idea is familiar from other
contexts:
Suppose that government agents break into a farmhouse without a warrant
and seize papers that they find inside.  Have they violated the Fourth
Amendment?  There is no way to answer in the abstract.  Under normal cir-
cumstances, the search might very well be unreasonable.  But if the United
GARY LAWSON ET AL., THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 120, 121–33,
136–41 (2010) [hereinafter ORIGINS].
124 Lawson & Seidman, supra note 123, at 141.
125 Estwick v. City of London, (1647) 82 Eng. Rep. 515, 516 (K.B.).
126 A genall Acte concnynge Comissions of Sewers to be directed in all parts within this
Realme, 1531, 23 Hen. 8, c. V, § 1 (Eng.).
127 See Rooke’s Case, (1598) 77 Eng. Rep. 209 (C.P.).
128 See Leader v. Moxon, (1773) 96 Eng. Rep. 546 (C.P.).
129 Roberts v. Hopwood, [1925] A.C. 578, 613 (H.L.).
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States was at war, and suspected enemy agents had been seen entering the
house repeatedly over the previous four hours, it would be hard to say that
the search and seizure was necessarily unreasonable.  Whether a search is
“reasonable” is a function of external events.130
By the same token, “presidents should have more discretion in ‘reasona-
bly’ enforcing the law when foreign soldiers are advancing toward Baltimore
or terrorists are plotting to blow up buildings than in normal times of
peace.”131  Of course, all presidential discretion must be an exercise of “exec-
utive” power rather than of some other kind of governmental power.  No
number of advancing troops or terrorists can authorize the President to seize
steel mills without statutory authorization132 or to order courts to dismiss
pending cases.133  But even within the compass of the President’s executive
power, that power is constrained by the principle of reasonableness.
Thus, the exercise of large portions of the President’s “executive Power”
is governed by a standard—and a standard that varies with circumstances—
rather than a rule.  In essence, the Article II grant of executive power to the
President is qualified by the principle of reasonableness so that it effectively
reads: “the executive power [necessary and proper for carrying into execu-
tion presidential functions] shall be vested in a President of the United
States.”
The phrase that we have interpolated into the Article II (and also the
Article III) Vesting Clause appears expressly in Article I, which grants Con-
gress power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for car-
rying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States or in any Depart-
ment or Officer thereof.”134  This clearly has elements of a standard, and the
range of “necessary and proper” laws, like the range of necessary and proper
executive actions, could expand or contract with circumstances.  “Laws that
are necessary and proper during wartime may not be necessary and proper
during peacetime.”135  While the Necessary and Proper Clause is considera-
bly less elastic than modern law would have it,136 it still has strong standard-
130 Gary Lawson, Ordinary Powers in Extraordinary Times: Common Sense in Times of Crisis,
87 B.U. L. REV. 289, 303–04 (2007).
131 Id. at 307.
132 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (getting it right).
133 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (getting it wrong).
134 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.  The phrase expressly appears in Article I but not in
Articles II and III because it was unclear in the eighteenth century whether the principle of
reasonableness applied to a legislative body such as Congress. See Lawson & Seidman,
supra note 123, at 133–36.  A drafter who wanted to confirm the application of the princi-
ple to Congress was well advised to specify it, though we think the better view would hold
that the principle would apply to Congress even without specification because Congress,
unlike Parliament, exercises only delegated authority.
135 Lawson, supra note 130, at 308.
136 The causal connection required by the word “necessary” is stronger than a rational
basis test (though less stringent than Jefferson’s proposed test of absolute necessity), see
Lawson, supra note 36, at 246–48, and the word “proper” imports a range of requirements
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like rather than rule-like qualities.  And because the Necessary and Proper
Clause is implicated in some fashion in virtually all federal legislative activ-
ity,137 its standard-like character pervades the document.
But the Article II (and Article III) Vesting Clause and the Necessary and
Proper Clause are only the tip of an iceberg of standards floating beneath the
surface of the Constitution.  Or, more precisely, the principle of reasonable-
ness embodied by these provisions is a special case of a much wider standard-
like principle that underlies the entire constitutional scheme of enumerated
powers.
One of us has elsewhere argued—though he would prefer to say
“explained” or “demonstrated”—that the Constitution is best understood as a
kind of agency instrument, in which the principal, “We the People,” entrusts
some measure of control over its affairs to a set of governmental agents.138
Under eighteenth-century agency law (and today), governmental agents such
as Congress are therefore under fiduciary obligations in the exercise of their
powers.  Some of those fiduciary obligations are rule-like, such as the flat
obligation not to re-delegate their delegated authority but to exercise their
own judgment within the scope of their agency.139  Other fiduciary obliga-
tions, however, are quintessential standards, such as the obligation to treat
multiple principals fairly and equitably (though not necessarily with strict
equality)140 and to exercise reasonable judgment and care.  Because these
fiduciary standards are a backdrop against which all of the powers in the
Constitution are granted, they pervade the entire document.  When Con-
gress exercises its power to, for example, regulate commerce among the sev-
eral states,141 it violates the Constitution if it fails to provide, for lack of a
better term, equal protection to all of its beneficiaries or fails to exercise
reasonable care in its inquiries and judgments.
The extensive role of standards in understanding the Constitution
means that one cannot dismiss expressly standard-like provisions as constitu-
that go far beyond (but certainly include) respecting fundamental principles of federalism.
See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 123; see also Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The
“Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J.
267 (1993).
137 See Gary Lawson et al., Raiders of the Lost Clause: Excavating the Buried Foundations of
the Necessary and Proper Clause, in ORIGINS, supra note 123, at 1, 3–4.
138 See Lawson, Seidman & Natelson, supra note 36.  More accurately, Rob Natelson has
explained and demonstrated this point; Professors Lawson and Seidman are simply—
though they think constructively—helping to develop his insights.
139 This fiduciary obligation is the ultimate source of the nondelegation doctrine,
though that obligation is focused and channeled through the textual requirement in the
Necessary and Proper Clause that congressional acts implementing other federal powers
be “proper.”  The President, for his part, is permitted to, in effect, “delegate” executive
authority to subordinates because the “executive Power” with which he is vested includes
the power either to act or to supervise. See id. at 448 n.173.  Judges who delegate their
judicial power to law clerks, on the other hand, are irresponsible and impeachable. See id.
140 See id. at 441.
141 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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tional anomalies, to be minimized or ignored for interpretative purposes.
The Constitution uses rules when it means to use rules, and it uses standards
when it means to use standards.  It makes extensive use of both.  To discover
the meaning of the Constitution, one cannot start with a presumption in
favor of one or the other kind of formulation.  One finds what one finds.  If
Justice Scalia believes otherwise, he is simply wrong.
To be sure, one could offer a somewhat sideways argument against this
conclusion.  The Constitution proclaims itself to be law—indeed, to be
“supreme Law.”142  If law really does consist only of rules as a matter of legal
metaphysics, then any features of the Constitution that seem to be standards
would therefore not qualify as law, and therefore would not qualify as part of
the Constitution.  But this argument, at least as a matter of interpretation,
puts the cart before the horse.  What is declared by the Constitution to be
supreme law is “this Constitution”—whatever it happens to be.  What was
ordained and established by “We the People” was “this Constitution”143—
whatever it happens to be.  What takes effect upon ratification is “this Consti-
tution”144—whatever it happens to be.  Judges and other governmental offi-
cials swear an oath to support “this Constitution”145—whatever it happens to
be.  If “this Constitution” declares certain standards to be law, then that is the
definition of law that governs the meaning of the document for purposes of
interpretation.
In a similar vein, if Article III incorporated something like Justice
Scalia’s view of adjudication as part of the “judicial Power” vested in Article
III courts, then there would be a straightforward interpretative case for
courts to prefer rules.  But we do not see much future in that argument in its
boldest form.146  For one thing, it would not apply to adjudication by state
courts, state officials, jurors, federal legislative courts, the President, mem-
bers of Congress, or any other actors who do not gain their power from Arti-
cle III.  It is not impossible that the Constitution prescribes a particular
method of constitutional adjudication for federal judges and only federal
judges, but it is an odd enough result to give one.  More fundamentally, how-
ever, it runs into the same cart-before-the-horse problem noted above.  The
essence of the judicial power is the power and duty to decide cases in accor-
dance with governing law.  The Constitution is part of that governing law,
and indeed is, according to its own terms, hierarchically superior to all com-
peting sources of law.  If the Constitution includes as part of its own supreme
law a standard, it is hard to see a constitutional reason for declining to follow
it.  To be sure, there may be moral or philosophical reasons for disregarding
the Constitution or for placing some other source of law above it, but they
are not constitutionally grounded reasons.
142 Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
143 Id. pmbl.
144 Id. art. VII.
145 Id. art. VI, cl. 3.
146 Professor Lawson thinks that there might be a very modest future for such an argu-
ment in a significantly meeker form. See supra note 31.
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Accordingly, we think that Justice Scalia is wrong to insist upon rules and
only rules in adjudication in circumstances in which the Constitution clearly
prescribes standards instead.  Judges swear an oath to uphold “this Constitu-
tion,” whatever it might prescribe.  If the Constitution prescribes the exercise
of relatively unconstrained judicial judgment in some contexts, that is its pre-
rogative, however wise or unwise that prescription might be.  Thus, with
respect to matters such as the nondelegation doctrine, where the original
meaning of the Constitution is quite clear that there are real limits on the
extent to which Congress can vest discretion in executive or judicial actors,
there is no constitutional warrant for ignoring that principle in adjudication
simply because the principle takes the form of a standard rather than a rule.
The rule of law is a law of law.
